Public Trust in Elections: The Role of Election Administration Autonomy and Media Freedom by Kerr, Nicholas & Lührmann, Anna
I N S T I T U T E
Public Trust in Elections: The Role of 
Election Administration Autonomy 
and Media Freedom
Nicholas Kerr
Anna Lührmann
Working Paper 
SERIES 2016:36
THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE 
September 2016
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to the conceptualization and measurement 
of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame. 
With a V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg that comprises almost ten staff members, and 
a project team across the world with four Principal Investigators, fifteen Project Managers, 30+ 
Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 2,500 Country Experts, 
the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science research-oriented data collection 
programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
V-Dem Institute 
Department of Political Science  
University of Gothenburg 
Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711 
SE 40530 Gothenburg 
Sweden 
E-mail: contact@v-dem.net 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V-Dem Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.v-dem.net.   
Copyright © 2016 by authors. All rights reserved. 
 
	 1	
Public Trust in Elections: The Role of Election 
Administration Autonomy and Media Freedom ∗ 
 
 
 
Nicholas Kerr  
Assistant Professor 
University of Alabama  
 
Anna Lührmann  
Post-Doc 
V-Dem Institute 
University of Gothenburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																						
∗ This research project was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, 
V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; by Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg 
Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg, Grant 2013.0166, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; as 
well as by internal grants from the Vice-Chancellor’s office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the 
Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. We performed simulations and other computational 
tasks using resources provided by the Notre Dame Center for Research Computing (CRC) through the High 
Performance Computing section and the Swedish National Infrastructure for Computing (SNIC) at the National 
Supercomputer Centre in Sweden. We specifically acknowledge the assistance of In-Saeng Suh at CRC and Johan 
Raber at SNIC in facilitating our use of their respective systems. For helpful comments, we thank Seoyoun Choi, 
Kyle Marquardt, Shane Singh and participants of the University of Gothenburg’s Elections, Opinion and 
Democracy Workshop (4/2016), the ECPR Joint Sessions in Pisa (4/2016), the EIP/V-Dem pre-APSA workshop 
(8/2016) and the APSA panel on the Quality of Elections (8/2016) where earlier versions of this paper were 
discussed. 
	 2	
Abstract 
As multiparty elections have become a global norm, scholars and policy experts regard public 
trust in elections as vital for regime legitimacy. However, very few cross-national studies have 
examined the consequences of electoral manipulation, including the manipulation of election 
administration and the media, on citizens’ trust in elections. This paper addresses this gap by 
exploring how autonomy of election management bodies (EMBs) and media freedom 
individually and conjointly shape citizens’ trust in elections. Citizens are more likely to express 
confidence in elections when EMBs display de-facto autonomy, and less likely to do so when 
media entities disseminate information independent of government control. Additionally, we 
suggest that EMB autonomy may not have a positive effect on public trust in elections if media 
freedom is low. Empirical findings based on recent survey data on public trust in 47 elections 
and expert data on de-facto EMB autonomy and media freedom support our hypotheses.  
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1. Introduction 
On March 10, 2010, thousands of Nigerians marched through their capital, Abuja, bearing 
placards that indicated their disgust with the country’s electoral management body (EMB) – the 
organization vested with the legal responsibility to organize, supervise, and adjudicate on some or 
all stages of the electoral process.1 Nigerians from all walks of life demanded, among other things, 
the immediate sacking of the EMB commissioner, Professor Maurice Iwu, for his mismanagement 
of the 2007 elections and his alleged allegiance to the ruling Peoples Democratic Party. Across the 
world, citizens have staged similar mass protests demanding electoral reform and expressed their 
frustration with EMBs perceived as politically manipulable, complicit in electoral fraud, and ill-
prepared for elections.  
 As multiparty elections have become a global norm, scholars and policy experts regard 
public trust in elections as vital for regime legitimacy (Moehler, 2009; Rose & Mishler, 2009; 
Norris, 2014). Incumbent regimes, like the Nigerian during the 2007 elections, often use 
elections as a way to gain legitimacy, meanwhile these regimes try to reduce the risk of electoral 
defeat by employing various strategies of electoral fraud, including the manipulation of election 
administration.  
 Can manipulated elections confer popular legitimacy on regime institutions and elected 
representatives? In the case of Nigeria, following the 2007 elections, popular legitimacy in 
electoral processes was significantly undermined because of the EMB’s lack of impartiality, and 
was only restored after the government embarked upon an electoral reform process that 
included, among other things, the replacement of the EMB commissioner with Atahiru Jega who 
was nationally regarded as politically independent (Lewis, 2011). However, after recent elections 
in countries such as Russia (Rose & Mishler, 2009) or Rwanda  (Reyntjens, 2015) blatant 
manipulation of election administration has not resulted in public outcry.   
 The link between electoral manipulation and popular legitimacy, though much debated, 
has received relatively less attention in the cross-national research on electoral manipulation. So 
far, studies have focused on documenting the ‘menu’ of manipulative strategies and whether 
these strategies, used individually or in combination, could undermine regime legitimacy among 
political elites, collective domestic actors, and international actors (Birch, 2011; Schedler, 2013; 
Simpser, 2013; Gehlbach et al., 2015; Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015).  
 
																																																						
1 For more information on the March 2010 protests see LeVan and Ukata (2012).  
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This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature by exploring how the manipulation of 
election administration and the media may influence citizens’ trust in the integrity of elections.  
First, we focus on election administration as a venue of incumbent manipulation because it is 
one of the most frequently manipulated elements of the electoral process (Birch, 2011) and 
numerous case and policy-oriented studies associate EMB autonomy with the electoral 
credibility (Lopez-Pintor, 2000; Wall, 2006).  However, only a handful of cross-national studies 
have explored the link between EMB autonomy and citizens’ perceptions of election quality 
(Birch, 2008; Hartlyn et al., 2008; Rosas, 2010). These studies use de-jure indicators of EMB 
autonomy and assume that these formal-legal institutional characteristics will influence citizens’ 
attitudes about the quality of elections. However, they have not provided empirical support for 
the notion that EMBs matter for citizens’ perceptions of election quality. 
We take a different approach in this paper by focusing on the de-facto autonomy of EMBs. 2 
Specifically, we argue that in countries where EMBs display de-facto autonomy, citizens are more 
likely to express confidence in elections. De-facto EMB autonomy is important for citizens 
because it provides information on the ability of the institution to resist incumbent manipulation 
and deter electoral fraud. To put it plainly, citizens’ trust in elections is affected by the perceived 
neutrality of the electoral authorities and their expected capability to ensure that all political 
actors play by the rules. As a consequence, when EMBs are perceived to be in the back pocket 
of the incumbent (or any other political or societal interests), citizens are less likely to have 
confidence in the institution’s ability to carry out its functions during the course of the elections. 
Most importantly, citizens will question the final results of the elections because EMB officials 
play such a critical role in voting operations.  
In addition to EMBs, the media also influences public trust in elections (Leeson, 2008; 
Birch, 2011; Schedler, 2013; Coffé, 2016). Nonetheless, research on how media freedom may 
structure citizens’ trust in elections is relatively underdeveloped. Here we argue that citizens’ 
ability to make election quality judgments is a function of the quantity and quality of information 
that they receive about the electoral process. When electronic, print, and social media can 
operate in an environment free of government censorship or backlash, the media can provide a 
marketplace for citizens to gain varied, competing, and low-cost information about the quality of 
																																																						
2  We define de-facto EMB autonomy as the ability to make decisions and implement policy independent of the 
control of the incumbent and other political and societal actors. We use the terms autonomy and independence 
interchangeably throughout the text. We distinguish de-facto EMB autonomy from de-jure EMB autonomy that 
reflects legally or constitutionally defined characteristics of the institution that may potentially influence its 
autonomy in practice. Some of these formal-legal characteristics include the inclusiveness of the appointment 
process of EMB commissioners, the organizational location of EMBs relative to the executive, and rules on whether 
partisan or professional individuals should serve as commissioners.  We choose to focus on EMB de-facto autonomy 
because numerous studies have highlighted the incongruence between de-jure EMB characteristics and how the 
institution operates in practice, especially in contexts where informal politics is pervasive (e.g. Rosas 2008).  
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elections. Following this, we expect that when media freedom is high, citizens are more likely to 
become aware of electoral manipulation and therefore less likely to express confidence in 
elections when compared to countries where media freedom is restricted. 
Along with exploring the direct effects of EMB autonomy and media freedom on citizens’ 
trust in elections, we also consider whether the relationship between EMB autonomy and 
citizens’ trust in elections may be conditional on the level of media freedom.  Specifically, we 
believe that the positive effect of EMB autonomy on citizens’ trust in elections is most likely to 
be observed when media freedom is sufficiently high. Conversely, at low levels of media 
freedom, EMB autonomy may have no discernable association with citizens’ trust in elections, as 
citizens are less likely to be exposed to critical information on the performance of the EMB.  
 We examine these three hypotheses in 47 elections across a variety of regime types and 
world regions. Importantly, we incorporate public opinion data on citizens’ trust in elections 
from the most recent rounds of the World Values Survey (WVS) and Afrobarometer as well as 
expert data on EMB autonomy and media freedom from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). The 
results of the empirical analyses support the main hypotheses. Mainly we find that EMB 
autonomy is associated with higher levels of public trust in elections, while media freedom seems 
to dampen public trust in elections.  Moreover, we find some support for the conditional effect 
of media freedom on the association between EMB autonomy and citizens’ trust in elections.  
The following section provides an overview of the current debates on these issues and 
outlines the theoretical argument (section 2). Then, we test our argument empirically (section 3) 
and conclude with brief discussion of the implications of our findings (section 4).  
 
2. Current Debates and Theory  
2.1. Citizen Perceptions of Election Quality 
Citizen trust in elections is essential for the legitimacy of elected representatives and the regime, 
especially in regimes with less experience with multiparty elections. Several empirical studies find 
that citizens who experience fraudulent, violence-ridden or poorly organized elections, are less 
likely to express confidence in the elected representatives, and more likely to engage in anti-
regime protests or violence (Rose & Mishler, 2009; Norris, 2014). In other words, incumbents 
who manipulate elections may run the risk of losing popular legitimacy. 
Prior studies show that citizens possess the cognitive capacity to evaluate the quality of 
elections and develop these evaluations either through 1) personal experience during various 
stages of electoral process or, 2) information gathered from a variety of second hand sources 
	 6	
including the media, political parties, and informal conversations (Bratton, 2013). In fact, 
empirical studies find that citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity are strongly correlated with 
various independently measured macro-level indicators of election quality, including expert 
perceptions of electoral integrity (Norris, 2014), the performance of election administration 
(Bowler et al., 2015), and the incidence of electoral violence (Mattes, 2014).  
Despite empirical evidence pointing to the collective rationality of citizens in evaluating 
electoral processes, there are instances where citizens’ perceptions, even when aggregated, may 
be incongruent with other aggregate-level indicators of election quality. For instance, there have 
been several elections in which experts and international observers characterized excessively 
manipulated that recorded seemingly high levels of public confidence.  
One reason for this incongruence relates to citizens’ unwillingness to reveal their true 
assessments of the election due to fear of repercussions from the government or because 
expressing such views may be socially unacceptable.3 A second, and more widely studied reason 
is that citizens may place greater importance on specific political or economic factors when 
assessing electoral integrity. For instance numerous cross-national studies find that citizens’ 
status as a winner or loser, or their party affiliation remains an important predictor of election 
integrity assessments (Anderson et al., 2005). Similarly, Rose and Mishler (2009) note that 
Russians with a positive assessment of the regime’s political and economic performance were 
also more inclined to praise the quality of the 2007 Duma elections, despite the incumbent’s 
egregious attempts to undermine the integrity of the vote. A third explanation for the 
incongruence, and the one we emphasize in this study, is that in some contexts citizens may not 
be able to develop a complete understanding of the quality of elections because they lack 
sufficient information about the nature and extent of manipulation.  
 
2.2. Autonomy of Election Management Bodies 
Scholars and policy practitioners have widely recognized autonomous, professional, and 
transparent election administration as the lynchpin of electoral credibility (Pastor, 1999; Elklit & 
Reynolds, 2002; Mozaffar, 2002). EMBs are often viewed as institutions that provide both vertical 
and horizontal accountability during elections by holding elites accountable to the rules of the 
electoral game and also ensuring that citizens’ right to vote is not violated during various stages 
of the electoral process.   
																																																						
3 Self-censorship, as a result of political fear and social desirability bias has been evinced in research on political 
campaigns and elections (e.g. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Bratton et al., 2016).   
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Ultimately, EMBs – if they are independent – can act as a bulwark against attempts to 
manipulate the electoral process. Conversely, installing biased EMBs is a key tool for incumbents 
to manipulate the electoral process.  As van Ham and Lindberg (2015) note, this tool is relatively 
cheap compared to other forms of electoral manipulation such as vote-buying. Schedler (2013) 
expects the legitimacy costs associated with electoral fraud – such as political influence on the 
EMB – to be lower than the cost of repressive or exclusionary tactics, because fraud would be 
more difficult to detect.  
In general, cross-national research on the relationship between EMB autonomy and 
citizens’ election quality perceptions so far has been limited. The few existing studies have relied 
primarily on macro-level measures of EMB de-jure autonomy. These de-jure measures include the 
organizational location of the EMBs relative to the executive, the partisan or professional 
composition of the EMB commissioners, the inclusiveness of the appointment process of EMB 
commissioners and the security of tenure for EMB commissioners.4 Most of these studies find 
very little evidence for a positive correlation of EMB de-jure autonomy with public trust in 
elections (Birch, 2008; Hartlyn et al., 2008; Rosas, 2010). In fact, many of these studies admit 
that citizens are less likely to respond to institutional characteristics of EMB autonomy as stated 
in law (i.e. de-jure EMB autonomy), but instead to whether EMBs exercise autonomy in practice 
(i.e. de-facto EMB autonomy). So far, only very few studies have explored the link between EMB 
performance and public trust and these studies have not empirically disentangled the effect of 
EMB de-facto autonomy from other dimensions of EMB performance (e.g. Kerr, 2014; Bowler 
et al., 2015).5 
Our work seeks to make two theoretical contributions to the cross-national literature on 
EMB autonomy. First, we conceptualize de-facto EMB autonomy as the ability to make decisions 
and implement policy independent of the control of the incumbent and other political and 
societal actors.6 Second, we carefully evaluate the processes through which citizens access 
information about EMB autonomy when forming their judgments about the integrity of 
elections. In so doing, we focus on the characteristics of the media landscape and how the 
independence of media can mediate the link between EMB autonomy and public trust in 
elections.  
 
																																																						
4 See Birch (2011) for a detailed assessment of the de-jure EMB autonomy measures.  
5 Other single-country studies probe citizens’ experiences with election administration and find that experiences that 
provide information about EMB de-facto autonomy, such as the impartiality of poll workers, seemingly boost 
citizens’ trust in elections (e.g. Alvarez et al., 2008). 
6 This conceptualization is informed by prior research on EMB autonomy (Lopez-Pintor, 2000; Gazibo, 2006; Wall, 
2006; Birch, 2011), as well as seminal work on bureaucratic autonomy (Hammond & Knott, 1996) and the 
autonomy of regulatory agencies (Cukierman et al., 1992).  
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2.3. Media Freedom 
Liberal democratic theorists have considered media freedom essential for the deepening of 
democracy (Gunther & Mughan, 2000; Besley & Prat, 2006) and preventing of democratic 
reversals (Teorell, 2010). Likewise, the role of the ‘fourth estate’ is important during elections. 
Various scholars have noted how media freedom increases the costs of manipulation 1) directly, 
as journalists investigate and expose electoral fraud, but also 2) indirectly as media entities 
provide opposition parties, domestic civil society groups, and international observers with 
alternative venues to propagate their assessments of the election. According to Birch (2011: 59), 
independent media raise the domestic legitimacy costs of manipulation and provides an 
indication of “the extent to which the population is capable of monitoring, exposing, and 
reacting to various aspects of the electoral process.” Additionally, Norris (2014: 96) argues that 
traditional and social media accounts that are critical of electoral manipulation “provide 
benchmarks that the general public uses to assess electoral malpractices.” For Schedler (2013: 
274) “media restrictions shape the window through which citizens see the political world.”  
It is no surprise then that media, especially the most independent entities and personalities, 
are often the target of repression and censorship because of their potential to expose citizens to 
the manipulative strategies of regime elites and to what Schedler (2013: 67) refers to as 
“competing constructions of political reality”. Numerous studies have formally modeled the 
dynamics of media manipulation and find that media manipulation can be an effective strategy 
for winning elections, especially in non-democratic regimes. Specifically, regime incumbents 
often manipulate media as well as other informational sources to sway public opinion (Gehlbach 
& Sonin, 2014) or to discourage anti-regime mobilization (Egorov et al., 2009).    
Notwithstanding the theoretical relevance of the media, the existing literature has not fully 
explored how media freedom may structure the process through which citizens form their 
opinions about election quality.7 Most empirical studies have examined the impact of media by 
looking at the demand side of the equation (i.e. citizens’ demand for, or ability to process 
political information) and find that citizens demand for, or exposure to, different media sources 
can influence their electoral integrity judgments (Moehler, 2009; Robertson, 2015).  To the best 
of our knowledge, only Coffé (2016) examines the role of the media environment (i.e. supply 
side of the equation) and how the degree of media freedom may influence the quantity and 
quality of information citizens can potentially access about the quality of elections. Coffé’s 
results are instructive for our research as they indicate that the relationship between media 
																																																						
7 Other studies have empirically probed the consequences of media control for citizens’ electoral attitudes and 
political behavior (e.g. Leeson, 2008), however, very few focus on the consequences for public trust in elections. 
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exposure and the accuracy of citizens’ election integrity evaluations may vary by the level of 
press freedom within a country.8 We build upon the Coffé’s research by arguing that citizens’ 
evaluations of election quality may depend on characteristics of the media landscape, specifically 
whether media institutions exercise some autonomy by disseminating information that 
potentially undermines the credibility of the electoral process.  
We conceptualize media freedom as the ability of media entities to collect and publicly 
disseminate political and official information, independent of government control or 
interference.9 Media freedom is most clearly demonstrated when media entities routinely 
monitor and publicly criticize government activity. Consequently, if media lacks independence, 
citizens are less likely to be exposed to elite interpretations that may reveal information about 
electoral manipulation, including attempts to undermine the quality of election management 
bodies, bribe voters, or stifle opposition candidates. In short, if media is biased towards the 
incumbent, voices criticizing the quality of elections are less likely to be reflected, and 
consequently, citizens are less likely to become aware of electoral manipulation. This may result 
in relatively favorable views about the quality of elections. The reverse is also true. When media 
environment exercises greater freedom from government control, interpretations of election 
quality become more pluralistic and in contexts where manipulation occurs or is alleged to have 
occurred, citizens are more likely to gain knowledge about it. This knowledge could potentially 
influence the process through which citizens form judgments about the quality of elections.  
 
 
2.4. The Conditional Effect of Media Freedom on the Relationship between 
EMB Autonomy and Public Trust in Elections.  
Not only may media freedom have a direct effect on public trust in elections, but it may also 
moderate the association between EMB autonomy and citizens’ trust. The main aspects of our 
theory concerning the mediating role of media on the relationship between EMB autonomy and 
citizens’ trust are summarized in Figure 1.  To begin with, we assume that citizens are likely to 
receive information about the quality of election management from two main sources: 1) 
personal experience with election administration and, 2) the media (broadcast, print and 
																																																						
8 Specifically for Coffé (2016) accuracy refers to the degree of association between citizens’ election quality 
perceptions and experts’ opinion of election quality.    
9 Recent scholarship on media freedom has informed this conceptualization (e.g. Bairett, 2015; Kellam & Stein, 
2015). 
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electronic). 10 Our theoretical account focuses primarily on the second source – media – because 
it is a key source of information for many citizens and has not been studied extensively in the 
context of perceptions of election quality.  
 
Figure 1: How Media Links Election Management to Public Trust in Elections  
 
Note: The last part of the figure is in grey because the causal link between public trust in elections and regime legitimacy will not be 
studied empirically in this paper.   
 
Because of the centrality of election administration to the integrity of the electoral process, 
election stakeholders, including the incumbent, opposition, domestic and international observers 
are incentivized to provide assessments of the quality of election administration during different 
stages of the electoral cycle and most certainly after an election. As many scholars have 
indicated, media filters the dissemination of these elite frames concerning the integrity of the 
elections to the public.  We contend that the extent to which the public becomes aware of these 
diverse and potentially competing interpretations of election management quality depends, in 
part, on the degree of media freedom. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2. Specifically, we 
expect that when media freedom is high, improvements in EMB autonomy are positively 
associated with public trust in elections. In such contexts, if EMB manipulation occurs, there is a 
greater likelihood that citizens are exposed to information about the flaws in election 
administration, which could consequently reduce their trust in elections. Conversely, Figure 2 
also shows that at low levels of media freedom, improvements in EMB autonomy are less likely 
to boost citizens’ trust in elections. In fact, we believe that when media freedom is low there may 
be no significant difference in public trust in elections between EMBs with high and low levels 
of autonomy. One reason for this is that in such contexts media reports are less likely to reflect 
opposition or civil society viewpoints that could potentially reveal information about EMB 
																																																						
10 Citizens also form opinions in direct interaction with party activists and based on word-of-mouth.  However, 
third-party statements are informed by individual perceptions as well as media and hence are not conceptualized 
here separately.  
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performance. Hence, the positive effect of EMB manipulation on citizens’ trust in elections is 
most likely to be observed during elections where media exercise some degree of independence 
from government control.  In other words, rulers who manipulate election management as well 
as the media seem to be more likely to avoid the public backlash, relative to those who allow 
public media to flourish.  
 
Figure 2: The Effect of EMB Autonomy on Public Trust in Elections in Two Different 
Scenarios of Media Freedom 
 
 
 
2.5 Summary and Hypotheses  
In summary we suggest the autonomy of election management has a strong and positive 
influence on citizens’ evaluations of electoral processes. Hence,  
 
H1: In countries with higher levels of EMB autonomy citizens are more likely to display trust in elections 
(relative to countries with lower EMB autonomy). 
  
Furthermore, many regimes exert control over the media and use this control to block 
critical debate and analysis of the elections. If citizens are mainly exposed to state propaganda 
about elections, they are also more likely to believe the government’s interpretation of election 
quality. On the other hand, however, if media lack government restrictions, citizens are more 
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likely to become aware of alternative views of the election that may include information on 
electoral manipulation, and use this information when evaluating the quality of elections. 
Therefore,  
 
H2: In countries with higher levels of media freedom citizens are less likely to display trust in elections 
(relative to citizens in countries with lower media freedom). 
 
Finally, because the extent of media freedom may specifically influence the type of 
information that citizens have about EMB performance, we contend that the positive 
relationship between EMB autonomy and citizens’ trust in elections may be conditional on 
media freedom. Hence,  
 
H3: (conditional) In countries with lower levels of EMB autonomy citizens are more likely to display trust 
in elections if media freedom is low (relative to citizens in countries with low levels of EMB autonomy and free 
media).  
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
3.1. Data  
3.1.1. DV: Public trust in vote count  
The dependent variable of this study is public trust in the fairness of the vote count (public trust 
in vote count). We construct our measure from an identical question found on the 6th Wave of 
the World Values Survey (WVS, 2010 to 2014) and the 6th Round of the Afrobarometer (AB, 
2014-15), in which respondents were asked to evaluate how often in their country’s elections 
“votes are counted fairly.” We combine data from both surveys. This gives us reliable survey 
data with 59,904 respondents in 47 elections across multiple world regions (see Table A1 in 
Appendix). We selected public trust in the vote counting process as our measure of public trust 
in elections because it represents the stage of the electoral process that citizens are most likely to 
be intricately focused on and associate with the impartiality of election administration.11 If you 
recall, in most countries EMBs are constitutionally responsible for counting and tabulating votes 
																																																						
11 We considered creating an index of public trust in elections that includes the “votes counted fairly item” as well as 
other indicators of electoral integrity (e.g. Norris, 2013). However, we attempted to develop such an index across 
the 6 electoral integrity items available in the AB and WVS data and found that the Cronbach’s alpha is quite low 
for the pooled sample (a =0.39). As a result, we prefer to rely on a single item that most effectively captures the 
concept we are aiming to measure.  
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(Wall, 2006).  Therefore it is not unrealistic to expect that citizens will consider the autonomy of 
EMBs when making assessments of the integrity of the counting process. Furthermore, 
numerous other studies have used citizens’ confidence in the vote counting process as an 
indicator of public trust in elections (see Gronke, 2013).  
 Response options for public trust in vote count are reversed so that higher values correspond 
to high levels of public trust.12 Public trust in vote count has a mean of 2.8 with a standard deviation 
of 1.1. As shown in Figure 3, 60% of respondents worldwide express their confidence that votes 
were counted fairly (fairly often 25%; very often 35%). Moreover, across 47 election periods in 
our sample, German citizens (2013) displayed the highest level of trust in the vote count (mean 
3.8), while citizens in Nigeria (2011) were least trusting (mean 2.08).  
 
Figure 3: Public Trust in the Vote Count in 47 National Elections (2008-2015) 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Main IV: De-facto EMB autonomy  
Election quality is notoriously difficult to measure. Numerous studies have relied on the 
assessment of experts either in the form of national or international election observers or 
country specialists (Van Ham, 2014). The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data provide 
detailed, expert-based indicators on the quality of the election included in our study (Version 6.0; 
Coppedge et al 2016).13  In particular, the V-Dem dataset includes an indicator of the de-facto 
																																																						
12 Observations with item non-responses (“Don’t know” “No answer” etc.) are excluded from the analysis. 
13 The V-Dem project has compiled a data set on 400 different aspects of democracy with the help of more than 
2600 expert coders. Expert coders are typically academics from the respective country and are recognized experts 
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autonomy of Electoral Management bodies (EMB autonomy).14 V-Dem expert coders were 
asked: “Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have the autonomy from the government 
to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?” Potential 
responses ranged on a scale from 0 (‘No, The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, 
the military, or other de-facto ruling body’) to 4 (‘Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially 
applies elections laws and administrative rules) (Coppedge et al., 2016: 76). 15  Notably, the EMB 
autonomy indicator gauges the extent to which EMB autonomy is realized in practice (de-facto) – 
a key distinction from studies that use formal-legal (de-jure) indicators of EMB autonomy.  
 While there are a handful of cross-national datasets that include relevant indicators of 
electoral administrative autonomy, we specifically utilize the EMB autonomy measure from V-
DEM because it is the only one, to our knowledge, that provides temporal and geographic 
coverage that corresponds to our survey data from Afrobarometer and the WVS (2008-2015). 
All other relevant data sources either fail to cover a significant proportion of countries in our 
survey sample (e.g. Birch, 2011), or their temporal coverage does not overlap with all the 
elections covered by Afrobarometer and WVS (e.g. Bishop & Hoeffler, 2016).  
Moreover, we are confident that V-DEM’s EMB autonomy indicator validly measures the 
concept of de-facto electoral administrative autonomy as reflected in the exiting theoretical and 
empirical literatures. Specifically, V-DEM’s indicator attempts to capture the extent to which 
EMBs exercise independence (and impartiality) in decision-making and the implementation of 
the law, which various scholars of electoral management have associated with the concept of de-
facto autonomy. For instance, Birch (2011: 179) operationalizes the concept of electoral authority 
independence through an indictor that gauges “whether the electoral authorities in practice 
exhibit independence and impartiality”. Similarly, Gazibo (2006: 616) regards autonomy as “an 
institution’s capacity to enforce its rules”. Meanwhile, Wall (2006: 23) focuses on the concept of 
normative EMB independence, which entails “independence of decision and action.” This 
conceptualization is closely linked to notions of impartiality as EMBs should “treat all election 
participants equally, fairly and even-handedly, without giving advantage to any political tendency 
or interest group” (Wall, 2006: 23).  
Our confidence in the validity of V-Dem’s EMB autonomy measure is further 
strengthened as we find that it corresponds with prior knowledge of specific country cases. 
																																																																																																																																																																							
on a specific sub-set of V-Dem indicators (Coppedge et al., 2016: 2-3). To ensure reliability of the indicators, V-
Dem assigns five expert coders per country to each indicator. Ratings are then aggregated based on a Bayesian 
ordinal item response theory model – which takes the reliability of individual coders into account – to point 
estimates used in the regression analysis of paper (Pemstein et al., 2015).  
14 EMB autonomy corresponds to the last election before the WVS or AB was administered.  
15 These ratings were then aggregated based on a custom-designed measurement model to point estimates (Pemstein 
et al. 2015). The version used here reconverted the data back to the original scale.  
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Across the country-election years in our sample, countries like Chile (2010) and Germany (2013) 
expectedly rank higher in EMB autonomy than Ukraine (2010) and Zimbabwe (2011). 
Furthermore the EMB autonomy measure also reflects well-documented improvements over 
time in EMB autonomy in countries like Nigeria and Tunisia as well as recent declines in Ghana 
and Ukraine (see Figure A1 Appendix).  
 As a first step in assessing the relationship between citizens’ trust and EMB autonomy 
across our sample we conduct a bivariate analysis. As expected, citizens’ trust in elections 
(country average) and the autonomy of the EMB are moderately correlated (r=0.52; Figure 4). 
However, Figure 4 also shows clearly that EMB autonomy influences but does not perfectly 
predict citizens’ perceptions of election quality as many citizens express trust even in elections 
without autonomous EMBs.   
 Furthermore, citizens seem to agree more about the assessment of their elections as 
autonomy of the EMB increases. Figure 5 illustrates that the standard deviation of citizens’ 
assessments of vote count by country decreases as EMB autonomy increases (r= -0.46). If it is 
beyond doubt that elections were independently managed, assessments of vote count might 
converge because challenges to election quality lack empirical foundation and hence are less 
often made. Conversely – as discussed above – in countries with less autonomous EMBs the 
interpretation of election quality becomes subject to an intense political struggle, which might 
explain the higher variance of citizens’ assessments of elections in such countries. Hence, these 
different patterns in country-level standard deviations support our notion that the relationship 
between EMB autonomy and citizens’ assessments of EMB autonomy could be contingent on 
additional factors such as media freedom.   
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Figure 4: Scatter Plot of Trust in the Vote Count (country average) by EMB Autonomy 
 
Figure 5: Scatterplot Variance of Trust in Vote Count within Countries by EMB 
Autonomy 
 
	 17	
3.1.3. Main IV: Media freedom  
We operationalize our concept of media freedom using an indicator from the V-Dem dataset, 
which reflects the degree to which major print and broadcast outlets “routinely criticize the 
government.”16 Unlike traditional indictors of media freedom, our media freedom indicator not 
only measures if the media is free to criticize the government, but if it actually does so in 
practice. Essentially, and similar to the EMB autonomy indicator, we are able to capture de-facto 
characteristics of the media environment. Recall, that we also consider the conditional effect of 
EMB autonomy on public trust in elections, we model this conditional effect by creating a 
multiplicative interaction term (EMB autonomy*media freedom).   
 
3.1.4. Macro-level controls 
We also consider other macro-level controls that previous studies have identified as important 
correlates of public trust in elections. First we control for GDP per capita (LOG) with the 
expectation that a country’s level of income might influence citizens’ evaluations of their 
elections, because indictors for social and economic performance of a country are often used to 
judge the performance of a government and administration (Roller, 2005). We also account for 
the proportionality of the electoral system, because research has shown that citizens’ trust in 
elections are boosted in countries under PR electoral rules, since in these electoral configurations 
minorities and women are represented more frequently than in majoritarian systems (Elklit & 
Reynolds, 2002; Birch, 2008).17  
 
3.1.5. Micro-level controls 
There are several individual-level characteristics that prior research has found to be correlated 
with citizens’ trust in elections. First, we control for citizens’ electoral support for the political 
party (or parties) that won the last elections (support winner). Previous research has consistently 
found that citizens affiliated with a party that wins an election tend to evaluate elections more 
positively that citizens affiliated with losing parties or those that report no partisan affiliation 
(Anderson et al., 2005). Furthermore, because voters tend to espouse more favorable opinions 
towards election quality than non-voters (Hall & Stewart, 2014), we account for whether citizens 
did not participate in the last election (did not vote). Next we model citizens’ political 
																																																						
16 The indictor captures the following question:  “Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely 
criticize the government?” on a scale from 0 (None) to 3 (“All major media outlets criticize the government at least 
occasionally.”)  
17 Due to our multi-level modeling strategy we pay very close attention to the number of election-level control 
variables we include within the analyses. We, however, examine the robustness of our main models by accounting 
for other election-level covariates that studies have found to be associated with trust in elections (see section 3.3).  
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sophistication through three variables: media exposure, political interest, and education. Of these three, 
media exposure is most relevant to our analysis, as research by Coffé (2016) shows that 
frequency of media use influences perceptions of election quality. Finally, we include a series of 
demographic controls including age, gender (female), and respondents’ socio-economic status (lived 
poverty index). 
 
3.2. Regression Analyses 
Our theoretical arguments have three main empirical implications. First, election management 
autonomy should be positively correlated with public trust in elections. Second, public trust in 
elections should decrease the more media are allowed to report critically. Third, the effect of 
EMB autonomy on public trust in elections may be conditional on the degree of media freedom. 
That is, EMB autonomy is less likely to increase public trust in elections if media freedom is low. 
In order to test these hypotheses we conduct a multilevel regression analyses (random-intercept) 
with individual-level trust in the fairness of the vote-count as dependent variable (Steenbergen & 
Jones, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 2012).18  
The main results from the regression are displayed in Table 1. Model 1 includes our 
indicators of EMB autonomy and media freedom along with other country-election year and 
individual-level controls. 19  The results support our expectations regarding hypothesis 1 as the 
coefficient for EMB autonomy is positive and statistically significant.20 This finding suggests that 
in countries where EMBs display higher levels of autonomy, citizens are, on average, more likely 
to consider the vote counting process fair, even after controlling for media freedom and other 
individual and country-election year level correlates. Figure 6 provides a substantive 
interpretation of this finding. Mainly, it shows that as EMB autonomy increases the adjusted 
means of public trust in elections are also predicted to increase.  
																																																						
18 We selected the multilevel estimation strategy because our sample includes data measured at two levels of analysis 
(i.e. individual-level & election-year-level) resulting in 59,904 respondents being nested in 47 country-election years. 
The intra-class correlation (ICC), which indicates the proportion of total variance that exists between countries 
(election years), is .160. We estimated random-intercept models in which we assume that the election-level 
intercepts vary based on our main election-level predictors, including EMB autonomy and media freedom.  Formally, our 
basic multilevel model (Model 1) includes the following two equations:  
(Trust in Vote Count)ij = β0j +  β1j (Support Winner) + β2j (Did Not Vote) + β3j (Media Exposure) + β4j (Political 
Interest) + β5j (Education) + β6j (Age) + β7j (Female) + β8j (Lived Poverty) + εij   
β0j = γ00 + γ01(EMB Autonomy)j + γ02(Media Freedom)j + γ03(GDP)j + γ04( Electoral System)j + δ0j  
where subscripts  and  represent for units in the individual and the country election 
year levels, respectively. The model is estimated using the XTREG command in STATA. To ensure the meaningful 
interpretation of the model intercept, we grand-mean center the individual-level independent variables (except for 
dummy variables). 
19 As suggested by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) the pseudo-R2, or the proportional reduction of error (PRE) for 
Model 1, is 3.96% at the level-1 and 48.42% at the level-2.  
20 We estimated a model similar to Model 1 (not shown) that did not include media freedom and the coefficient for 
EMB autonomy was positive and statistically significant.  
i∈ {1,2,⋯,N } j∈ {1,2,⋯,J }
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Consistent with hypotheses 2, the coefficient for media freedom is negative and statistically 
significant.21 This supports our contention that the presence of critical media is negatively 
associated with public trust in elections. To put it simply, countries where media has been critical 
of government, citizens, on average, report having less confidence in the vote count than in 
countries with lower levels of media freedom, all else being equal. As shown in Figure 7, media 
freedom is negatively associated with the predicted means of citizens’ trust in the vote count.  
 
Figure 6: Predicted Trust in Vote Count and EMB Autonomy (Model 1) 
  
Note: Dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals. Grey bars represent histogram of EMB autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
21 We estimated a model similar to Model 1 (not shown) that did not include EMB autonomy and the coefficient for 
media freedom was negative and statistically significant. 
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Table 1: Multi-level Models of Public Trust in Vote Count (DV) 
DV: Fair Vote Count Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 2.235*** 2.939*** 
 
(0.313) (0.603) 
Election Level   
EMB autonomy 0.326*** 0.0311 
 
(0.0688) (0.228) 
Media freedom  -0.432*** -0.660*** 
 
(0.143) (0.219) 
EMB autonomy *Media freedom – 0.133 
 
– (0.0983) 
GDP per capita (LOG) 0.0997*** 0.0642 
 
(0.0338) (0.0422) 
Majoritarian (ref: PR electoral systems) -0.0511 -0.0419 
 
(0.101) (0.0992) 
Mixed (ref: PR electoral systems) -0.0750 -0.0322 
 
(0.124) (0.125) 
Individual Level    
Support winners 0.301*** 0.301*** 
 
(0.00929) (0.00929) 
Did not vote  -0.164*** -0.164*** 
 
(0.00998) -0.00998 
Media exposure index -0.0552*** -0.0554*** 
 
(0.0194) -0.0194 
Political interest 0.0133*** 0.0133*** 
 
(0.00401) (0.00401) 
Education  -0.0213*** -0.0213*** 
 
(0.00291) (0.00291) 
Age 0.000580** 0.000578** 
 
(0.000279) (0.000279) 
Female  0.00851 0.00849 
 
(0.00782) (0.00782) 
Lived poverty index  -0.216*** -0.216*** 
 
(0.0155) (0.0155) 
Variance Components   
Individual-level  0.938*** 0.938*** 
 
(0.00271) (0.00271) 
Election-level 0.300*** 0.294*** 
 
(0.0312) (0.0306) 
-2* Log-Likelihood -81306 -81305 
Observations 59,904 59,904 
Elections 47 47 
Note: Multilevel (random-intercept) regression using XTREG in STATA. The maximum likelihood estimator is 
used. Standard errors are in parentheses.  All individual-level control variables (excluding dummies) are grand-mean 
centered.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
	 21	
Figure 7: Predicted Trust in Vote Count and Media Freedom (Model 1) 
 
Note: Dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals. Grey bars represent histogram of Media freedom.  
 
To examine our conditional hypothesis (3) that the positive relationship between EMB 
autonomy and public trust in elections may be moderated by the degree of media freedom, we 
include a multiplicative interaction (EMB autonomy*media freedom) in Model 2.22  The 
coefficient for the interaction is positive but fails to gain statistical significance in our model.  
However, as emphasized by Brambor et al. (2006: 70), even though the interaction term is 
statistically non-significant, the interaction might be statistically distinguishable from 0 at least at 
some levels of EMB autonomy. Therefore we graphically depict the interaction by showing how 
the adjusted means of trust in the vote count vary by level of EMB autonomy when media 
freedom is at its lowest and highest levels in our sample.23 As shown in Figure 8, when media 
freedom is at the lowest levels in the sample (1.026), public trust in elections is predicted to be 
relatively high (around 3) and there is no statistically significant effect of EMB autonomy on 
public trust in elections.  Compare this to the level of public trust in elections when media 
freedom is at the highest level in the sample (2.953). This slope is much steeper than the first, 
indicating a strong increase in predicted values for trust in the vote count from about below 2 to 
																																																						
22 The pseudo-R2, or the proportional reduction of error (PRE) for Model 2, is 3.96% at the level-1 and 50.46% at 
the level-2.  
23 We also graphically display how the average marginal effects of EMB autonomy on trust changes across different 
levels of media freedom (see Figures A2 and A3 in Appendix).   
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above 3 as EMB autonomy increases from its lowest to its highest level. When both 
relationships are considered simultaneously we see that media freedom is predicted to influence 
the effect of EMB autonomy on citizens’ trust in the vote count at a statistically significant level 
in contexts where EMB autonomy is at relatively low to medium levels. At high levels of EMB 
autonomy, an effect of media freedom on this relationship is less likely to be diagnosed. In other 
words, citizens of countries with low levels of EMB autonomy display higher levels of trust in 
elections, if media freedom is low when compared to when it is high. In fact, the results in 
Figure 8 closely resemble our proposed theory depicted in Figure 2 (section 2).  
 
Figure 8: Predicted Trust in Vote Count and EMB Autonomy, at High and Low Levels 
of Media Freedom (Model 2) 
  
Note: Dashed, thin outside lines give 95% confidence intervals. Grey bars represent histogram of EMB autonomy.  
 
Turning now to the controls in Model 2. First, with respect to our country-election year 
controls, we find that GDP per capita (Log) is not statistically significant, while neither mixed 
nor majoritarian electoral systems were more likely to enhance public trust in elections relative to 
PR electoral systems. At the individual-level our results show that supporters of the winning 
candidates, politically interested and elderly were more likely to express confidence in the vote 
counting process. At the same time, those who did not participate in elections, those who report 
higher levels of media exposure, the educated, and the poor were less likely to express 
confidence in the vote count.  
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3.3. Robustness Checks 
To verify the reliability of our main findings, we conducted a series of robustness checks. First, 
we account for omitted variable bias by estimating several models that incorporate additional 
election-level covariates of citizens’ trust in the fairness of the vote count. These include actions 
of political elites (whether opposition parties boycott elections or accept election results), the 
level of democracy (Freedom House civil liberties, political rights sub-scores and the combined 
Freedom House and Polity V indices), economic growth and natural resource endowments. 
Importantly, our main findings, as reported in Model 2, are not affected by the inclusion of these 
covariates (see Appendix Table A3: Models 3-9). 24  Second, we estimated our original analyses 
(Models 1 & 2) using linear random-intercept models on the assumption that or main dependent 
variable was continuous, we relaxed this assumption and re-ran the analysis using an ordinal 
logistic multilevel model and the substantive results were not affected (see Appendix Table A4: 
Model 10). Furthermore, because the empirical results may be sensitive to influential country-
cases, we carry out the jackknife estimation procedure, where one election at a time is left out of 
the analysis and find that our substantive results do not change. Finally, problematic thresholds 
for commonly used tests for multicollinearity are not are reached in Model 2. 25 
In sum, our main findings seem robust to several alternative model specifications and 
model diagnostics. More importantly, we have been able to demonstrate that across our sample 
of 47 country-election years public trust in the vote count process is positively associated with 
EMB autonomy and negatively correlated with media freedom. Hence, our findings provide 
strong empirical support for the notion that – ceteris paribus – manipulation of election 
management tends to reduce public trust in elections – as do improvements in media freedom. 
Moreover, our findings concerning the moderating effect of EMB autonomy on citizens’ trust 
are confirmed. Although the coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant, we 
were able to demonstrate through estimating predicted margins that EMB autonomy may not 
have a positive effect on public trust in elections if media freedom is low. 
 
 
 
																																																						
24 As additional robustness checks we controlled for other indicators of electoral integrity including the extent of 
election violence, government intimidation, and voting irregularities and the results in Model 2 hold. Results are not 
shown, due to space considerations, but are available upon request.  
25 We calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all covariates after estimating Model 2 as regular OLS model 
and they are below the critical threshold for multicollinearity. 
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4. Conclusion  
Despite the importance of public trust in elections for regime legitimacy, the link between 
electoral manipulation and public trust in elections has been theoretically and empirically 
underdeveloped in the existing literature. By focusing specifically on the manipulation of election 
management bodies (EMBs) and media, this paper offers a detailed assessment of the relevance 
of electoral manipulation for public trust in elections.  Using data from Afrobarometer and 
World Values Survey on public trust in elections as well as data from the V-Dem project on 
EMB autonomy and media freedom, we find that autonomy of election administration seems to 
increase public trust in elections, while media freedom reduces public trust in elections. 
Furthermore, media freedom seems to condition the positive effect of EMB autonomy on 
public trust in elections: EMB autonomy is less likely to be positively associated with public trust 
in elections in context where media freedom is low (compared to contexts where media freedom 
is high). 
We believe that our research makes key academic contributions. First, we expand upon the 
empirical and theoretical literature on electoral manipulation (Birch, 2011; Schedler, 2013; 
Simpser, 2013; Gehlbach et al., 2015) by demonstrating how attempts to undermine the 
autonomy of election administration may result in popular legitimacy costs – in the form of 
lower perceptions of electoral integrity. However, the extent to which manipulation can 
undermine popular legitimacy, depends in part on the characteristics of the institutional setting, 
such as the degree of media freedom, which may allow incumbents to influence citizens’ 
awareness of other manipulative strategies. 
 Second, our findings advance research on election administration by unearthing potential 
mechanisms through which citizens gain information about the autonomy of EMBs and make 
assessments of election quality.  To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to 
incorporate a measure of EMB de-facto autonomy and examine its effect on citizens’ trust in 
elections across a variety of regime types and world regions. Moreover, we are also unique in our 
attempt to theoretically and empirically model the potentially mediating effect of media freedom 
on the relationship between EMB autonomy and public trust in elections.  
Our findings also have mixed implications for policymakers. On the one hand, our results 
suggest that promoting media freedom might be an effective policy instrument to deter electoral 
fraud because of how media freedom can potentially increase the legitimacy costs of electoral 
manipulation. This policy could also extend to making alternative sources of information, such 
as the Internet, more available to citizens. For instance, Coffé (2016) shows that frequent use of 
the Internet enhances the accuracy of citizens’ assessments of the electoral process, even in 
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countries with limited media freedom.  On the other hand, the negative effect of media freedom 
on public trust in elections may be particularly damaging for regimes attempting to improve the 
quality of election administration and media freedom simultaneously. Increased media freedom 
may dampen improvements in public perceptions of election quality that arise when EMBs 
become more autonomous. This can add to the chronic instability of countries in the grey zone 
between established democracy and autocracies and the challenges of democracy promotion in 
such contexts.    
Further research is needed to shed light on this “paradox of media freedom” and the 
implications for policymakers. Moreover, scholars could also examine how individual-level 
factors – such as media consumption and winner/loser status – may affect the relationship 
between EMB autonomy and public trust in elections.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: How Often Were Votes Counted Fairly?  
CountryElectionyear_Survey Country average 
Germany2013_1 3.82 
Netherlands2012_1 3.72 
Australia2010_1 3.68 
Mauritius2010_0 3.59 
Niger2011_0 3.57 
Taiwan2012_1 3.52 
Uruguay2009_1 3.43 
Namibia2009_0 3.40 
Chile2010_1 3.36 
Botswana2009_0 3.32 
Poland2011_1 3.27 
Estonia2011_1 3.17 
Malaysia2008_1 3.12 
Rwanda2010_1 3.08 
Lesotho2012_0 3.02 
Burundi2010_0 3.01 
Burkina Faso2010_0 2.97 
Benin2011_0 2.96 
Sierra Leone2012_0 2.87 
Libya2012_1 2.85 
Uganda2011_0 2.84 
Kazakhstan2011_1 2.81 
Tanzania2010_0 2.79 
Philippines2010_1 2.77 
Cape Verde2011_0 2.76 
Tunisia2014_0 2.75 
Pakistan2008_1 2.72 
Zambia2011_0 2.72 
Ivory Coast2011_0 2.71 
Ghana2012_0 2.60 
Kyrgyzstan2011_1 2.57 
Mexico2008_1 2.57 
Kenya2013_0 2.53 
Azerbaijan2010_1 2.53 
Cameroon2013_0 2.52 
Jordan2010_1 2.50 
Liberia2011_0 2.48 
Zimbabwe2011_0 2.45 
Malawi2009_0 2.40 
Colombia2010_1 2.39 
Yemen2012_1 2.37 
Peru2011_1 2.36 
Ukraine2010_1 2.35 
Romania2012_1 2.32 
Algeria2014_0 2.32 
Sudan2015_0 2.26 
Nigeria2011_0 2.08 
Source: Suffix of election year indicates whether source was the 6. Wave World Value Survey (_1) or 6. Round Afrobarometer (_0); 
Scale ranges between 1 and 4 (1=”Not at all often”; 4=”Very often”) 
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Table A2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Votes counted fairly 59,904 2.83 1.05 1 4 
EMB autonomy 59,904 2.49 1.03 0.39 3.97 
Media freedom 59,904 2.28 0.48 1.03 2.95 
GDP p.c. (LOG) 59,904 7.57 1.50 4.99 10.68 
Electoral system      
         Proportional  59,904 0.35 0.48 0 1 
         Mixed 59,904 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Supported winning candidate 59,904 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Non-voter 59,904 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Media exposure 59,904 0.00 0.28 -0.52 0.48 
Political interest 59,904 0.05 1.04 -1.49 1.51 
Education 59,904 0.10 1.77 -3.05 2.95 
Age 59,904 0.03 1.00 -1.42 4.05 
Female 59,904 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Lived poverty 59,904 0.00 0.30 -0.32 0.68 
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Table A3: Alternative Model Specifications: Multi-level Models of Perceived Trust in the Fairness of the Vote Count (DV)  
DV: Fair Vote Count Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
        Constant 3.112*** 3.020*** 3.391*** 2.904*** 3.003*** 3.007*** 2.907*** 
 
(0.593) (0.583) (0.669) (0.718) (0.628) (0.616) (0.604) 
Election Level 
       EMB Autonomy 0.0131 0.0460 0.00374 -0.000610 0.0420 0.0127 0.0312
 
(0.226) (0.224) (0.223) (0.230) (0.256) (0.228) (0.228) 
Media freedom  -0.702*** -0.714*** -0.617*** -0.721*** -0.679*** -0.680*** -0.662*** 
 
(0.217) (0.212) (0.216) (0.217) (0.232) (0.220) (0.221) 
EMB autonomy*Media freedom 0.143 0.145 0.111 0.153 0.130 0.138 0.134 
 (0.0963) (0.0945) (0.0971) (0.0969) (0.102) (0.0980) (0.0984) 
GDP per capita (LOG) 0.0765* 0.0937** 0.0449 0.0684 0.0654 0.0633 0.0641 
 
(0.0423) (0.0439) (0.0431) (0.0425) (0.0454) (0.0420) (0.0423) 
Majoritarian (ref: PR electoral systems) -0.0453 -0.0721 -0.0232 -0.0455 -0.0246 -0.0389 -0.0417 
 
(0.0979) (0.0961) (0.0976) (0.0970) (0.104) (0.0988) (0.0993) 
Mixed (ref: PR electoral systems) 0.0468 0.0519 0.0213 0.0392 0.0349 -0.0278 -0.0339 
 
(0.128) (0.126) (0.127) (0.129) (0.135) (0.125) (0.128) 
Opposition boycotts -0.0689 
      
 
(0.0641) 
      Losers accept results 
 
-0.114
     
  
(0.0695) 
     Democracy (FH civil liberties) 
  
-0.0723
    
   
(0.0474) 
    Democracy (FH political rights) 
   
0.0197
   
    
(0.0509) 
   Democracy (FH & Polity IV) 
    
-0.00869
  
     
(0.0424) 
  GDP growth 
     
-0.00276
 
      
(0.00380) 
 Total natural resources (%GDP) 
      
0.000192
       
(0.00296) 
Individual Level (not shown) 
       
        Variance Components 
       Individual-level 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.938*** 0.936*** 0.931*** 0.938*** 0.938***
 
(0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00271) (0.00273) (0.00280) (0.00271) (0.00271) 
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Election-level  0.285*** 0.281*** 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.299*** 0.292*** 0.294*** 
 
(0.0303) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0302) (0.0325) (0.0304) (0.0306) 
-2* Log-Likelihood -78413 -78412 -81304 -79900 -74374 -81305 -81305 
Observations 58,077 58,077 59,904 58,981 55,141 59,904 59,904 
Number of Elections  45 45 47 46 43 47 47 
Note: The alternative model specifications were estimated on Model 3 (Table 1). Multilevel regression using XTREG in STATA. The maximum likelihood estimator is used. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Individual-level variables are country-mean centered but not shown in this model.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Alternative Model Specifications: Multi-level Ordinal Logit Regression Model 
DV: Fair Vote Count Model 10 
  Election Level 
 EMB autonomy 0.0814 
 
(0.485) 
Media freedom  -1.241*** 
 
(0.466) 
EMB autonomy *Media freedom 0.253 
 (0.209) 
GDP per capita (LOG) 0.146 
 
(0.0899) 
Majoritarian (ref: PR electoral systems) -0.0239 
 
(0.211) 
Mixed (ref: PR electoral systems) 0.0416 
 
(0.267) 
Individual Level (not shown) 
 
  Cutpoint 1  -2.020 
 
(1.283) 
Cutpoint 2 -0.358 
 
(1.283) 
Cutpoint 3 0.892 
 
(1.283) 
Variance Components 
 Election-level  0.391*** 
 
(0.0815) 
-2* Log-Likelihood -72685 
Observations 59904 
Elections  47 
Note: The alternative model specification was estimated on Model 2 (Table 1). Ordinal logit multilevel regression 
using MEOLGIT in STATA.  The maximum likelihood estimator is used. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Individual-level variables are country-mean centered but not shown in this model.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1: V-Dem De-Facto EMB Autonomy Time Trends for Selected Countries  
 
Source: V-Dem data set v6 (Coppedge et al 2016).  
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Figure A2: Average Marginal Effect of EMB Autonomy on Predicted Trust in Vote Count 
by Media Freedom (Model 2) 
 
Note: Dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals. Grey bars represent histogram of EMB autonomy.  
 
 
Figure A3: Average Marginal Effect of Media Freedom on Predicted Trust in Vote Count 
by EMB Autonomy (Model 2) 
 
Note: Dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals. Grey bars represent histogram of media freedom.  
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